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Jeff West and Annette McGrew 
Intellectual Independence: 
lslamism and the Decentering of Europe: 
disC/osure interviews S. Sayyid 
Dr. S. Sayyid is a University Research Fellow at the University of Leeds 
in Britain and author of the book, A F1111da1J1ental Fear: E11rocentris1J1 and 
the Emerg,ence of Is!aJJJism (1997, Zed Books). His research explores 
questions concerning the politicization of Islam, the production of 
cultural identities, and the use of discursive methodologies to analyze 
structures of social po~ver. He visited the University of l(entucky in 
February 2004 as part of the Spring Seminar and Lecture Series on 
Religion and Identity sponsored by the Ul( Committee on Social 
Theory and presented a lecture entitled 'Postcolonial Politics and 
Islam(ism).' Following the lecture, Dr. Sayyid sat down with members 
of disC/os11re's editorial collective to discuss some of the issues raised in 
his lecture and their entanglement with current events such as the 
United States' invasion of Iraq and its global pursuit of the 'War on 
Terror.' In the interview below, Sayyid presents his views on the 
differences between Islamism and Islamization, the competing claims 
of science and the Divine to authority within the Islamic state, and the 
decline of Eurocentrism manifested in the political ideology of Iran's 
Ayatollah I<homeini. 
disClosure: What is it exactly that defines Islamism as a socio-political 
entity? 
S. Sayyid: Islamism is not a specific ideology in the sense of closed 
system of beliefs, values and practices. Islamism is a discourse that 
seeks to re-center Islam within the public realm of Muslim 
communities. Islamism emerges in the context of a de facto (and often 
de jure) displacement of Islam from the public to the private sphere. In 
the wake of this displacement, Islamism seeks to re-center Islam within 
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Muslim communities. Thus, Islamists wish to see social relations re-
organized around the signifier of Islam. Islamists are committed to, they 
would argue, the re-politicization of Islam. This (re-) politicization arises 
from their opposition to the prevailing order in Muslim communities an.d 
their desire to institute a new foundation for society. Of course, there is 
great deal of diversity to be found among Isl~st~ reflecting l~cal 
contexts and specific historical trajectories. Such diversity, however, is a 
feature of all political discourses. For example, there are many 
differences between social democracy in Germany and social democracy 
in Spain, but these differences do not invalidate the existence of social 
democracy per se. Thus, to observe differences between Sayyid Qutb 
and I<homeini or Mawdudi and Ali Shariati does not put into question 
the unity of Islamism as a phenomenon. 
It is useful to distinguish (analytically at least) Islarnization from 
Islamism. Islamization is a strategy that emerges in the context of 
Islamism. Islamization is based on the blurring of frontiers between 
those who want to see Islam in public affairs and those who attempt to 
deny it such a space. Islamization is increasingly being pursued by 
many Muslim regimes as a means of weakening the Islarnist challenge, 
by conceding ground on issues of cultural representation, but keeping 
Islam at bay from areas of public policy, international relations, and 
economic affairs. Whereas Islamism seeks a radical transformation of 
society, Islamization seeks to maintain the 'command heights' of the 
status quo. Islarnization co-opts conservative Ulema and places the 
burden of representing the Islamic identity of a polity not on the 
regime but on those most sub-ordinated groups within society: women 
and minorities. Thus, regulation of the behavior of these groups 
becomes a marker of a community's Islamic identity. Islamization is 
basically a depoliticization. It argues that the way to get a good society 
is to have good individuals and good individuals come from the 
cultivation of the self. So, it actually tries to reduce Islam to simply a 
discipline for religious affirmation: you go to the inosque, you say your 
prayers, you are more pious, more committed and by that process you 
will then create a good society. Islamization is not the re-centering of 
Islam in the public realm but the intensification of the hold of Islam in 
the private sphere. 
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dC: This separation of the public from the private or the political from 
the religious seems to mirror the general modernist move that divides 
all the world into distinctive and bounded spheres of social, political, 
and economic relations. Are similar distinguishing moves being made 
by Islamists? If so, which types of distinguishing moves are they 
making? 
SS: This, I think, is one of the most pressing questions for Islamists. 
A lot of Islamists would argue that Islam is a total way of life and, as 
such, it encompasses everything. However, the attempt to actually 
concretize that total way of life is actually very limited. Islamists have 
on the whole tended to neglect cultural production instead identifying 
their platforms with cultural prohibitions. Thus, there are limited 
lslamist attempts to develop a specific aesthetics or the full range of 
cultural practices available to Islamicate civili~ation. One of ?1e 
consequences of Islamists focusing on the Medina state and .seemg 
subsequent Muslim history as a falling away fro~ that state, is. that 
historical resources and achievements beyond this very exceptional 
historical period of Islam during the Prophet's (p.b.u.h) rim~ rem~ 
unavailable to them. Thus, they are unable to have a conversation with 
their past. Too often, too many Islamists give the impression ~at ~n 
ideal Muslim subject is simply one who prays and carries out basic life 
functions. That is it. S/he has no hinterland. 
dC: What do you see as the relationship between the decentring of 
European or Western hegemony and Islamism. 
SS: I think the decentering of the West can be summarized as the 
abandonment of a sequence which goes from Plato to NA!O· It 
doesn't necessarily mean the abandonment of the contents which are 
contained within that sequence, as you can rearticulate those .contents 
with other kinds of sequences. I would argue that without a 
commitment to the de-centering of the West, the prospects for any 
lslamist movement becoming hegemonic is limited. Thus, ~e 
formation of Islamist hegemonies, and subsequently Isl~st 
government, depends largely on their ability to include this de-coloru.al 
moment (that is to build on the process of decentering of the West) m 
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their horizons. To the extent that Islamists move away from the 
decolonializing moment of the decentering of the West, the prospects 
for an Islamist hegemony fade. 
dC: In your book A F11ndamental Fear, Iran's Ayatollah I<homeini is a 
significant figure in that he incorporates Wester~ notion~ of 'peopl~,' 
'nation,' and 'state' into his political discourse while breaking the chain 
of reference to Europe that is a crucial aspect of Eurocentrism. How 
does this work? It is not as simple as just forgetting to mention the 
Western heritage of some of these ideas, is it? 
SS: Well, what is interesting is it's not I<homeini who said that the 
genealogy of these concepts is a Western one. It is actually ami 
Zubaida who is reading I<homeini and articulating that genealogy. 
When Zubaida claims that he has recovered Western concepts like 
'nation', 'people' and 'state' from I<homeini's A l-Ff11k11mah A!-Islam!Ja 
(Islamic Government) his claim is not a product of excavanon but 
rather an act of articulation which joins certain concepts like 'nas' to 
'people' and locates the concept of 'people' in the Pl~to-to- AT 
sequence. The identity of concepts comes not from their conte~t but 
from their inclusion in specific chains of references. These chains of 
references are socially constructed. There is no necessary link between 
one element of the chain and the next. Not all articulations are equal, 
some are institutionalized and sedimented- for many people, the 
sequence Plato-to-NATO seems to be the 'natural' reporting of a real 
state of affairs rather the contingent construction of a chain of 
references over a period of ti.me. Zubaida gives the impression that he 
sees in this sequence history not historiography. 
The idea that certain elements possess a Western heritage is not an 
intrinsic quality of those elements or an outcome of empirical 
methodologies. What is considered to be part of or outside of the 
Western heritage is a product of the construction of Western identity 
through the articulation of particular chains of references. For 
example, one could imagine a different sequence which begins with 
Aristotle and sees both Islam and the West not as two distinct cultural 
formations but rather as part of a single 'post-Aristotelian' civilization. 
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I<homeini, unlike many other thinkers associated with Islamism, 
does not actually try to find a Western pedigree for his concepts, that is, 
Zubaida has to do it for him. I<homeini's refusal to cite the Western 
heritage is a major break with a past in which Muslim reformers have 
constantly justified themselves by presenting their reforms as being 
consistent with and legitimated by Western civilization. I<homeini's 
rejection of such argumentation has two major consequences: firstly, it 
refuses to privilege the West as the only source of the universal, and 
secondly, it shifts the arguments for an Islamic order from an 
instrumental to an ethical logic. For Khomeini, the establishment of 
Islamic government is not necessary because such a government would 
be better "in making the trains run on ti.me" (though it may do that), 
rather an Islamic government has to be established because it is an 
obligation for Muslims. To be a Muslim means living under an Islamic 
government. In a sense, I<homeini's position echoes that ~aken by A~u 
Bakr following the death of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) that being a Muslim 
meant being a member of the Islamic state. 
dC: Thinking about tl1e move of power that I<homeini makes ~aise.s a 
couple of questions. I-low does one overcome that donunanng 
discourse of scientific rationalization and justification? What happens 
when one does make the sort of definitive statement that I<homeini 
does? Is there a reversal of modernity's primary-secondary 
categorization of science versus faith? In other words, does then faith 
become a primary descriptor? 
SS: It seems that opposition between faith and science may ?~ a 
phenomenon that does not resonate among Muslims. The opposinon 
between faith and science appears in the European context for set ~f 
contingent historical reasons, and there is little reason to assume that it 
can be simply extrapolated as a universal op~osition. Per~aps, one of 
the reasons why the opposition between science and faith may not 
operate in !v!uslim contexts is that in the Islamic concepti~n of the 
Divine the gap between God and human cannot be clo.sed. Sa~nce ~s a 
human activity cannot approach the Divine. The various soaologi~al 
studies that have documented the over-representation of people with 
scientific backgrounds within the various Islamist movements would 
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seem to support the idea that an opposition between science and faith 
is not necessarily a universal found in all cultural formations. 
dC: One of the intellectual criticisms of the Western project is that it 
contains a teleology whereby Europe itself becomes the end goal of its 
own political vision of the world. We see this European vision as being 
derived from a Christian apocalyptic mentality. Is there a similar 
teleological move or progressive moment that forms an important basis 
of the Islamist political perspective? 
SS: This is a very complex question. It turns upon two key points: the 
relationship between religious eschatology and political teleology, and 
the relationship between Islam and Islamism. 
As you point out, within the Western project you see the re-
occupation of Christian (theological) concepts during the progressive 
secularization of Western culture. Thus, themes found in Christian 
eschatology are also found in secularized discourses such as 
communism. The effort of various political movements to replace 
Christianity by inventing a secularized and 'rationalized' version is fairly 
well documented. It was not only the Nazis and Communists but also 
the Jacobians and Comtean positivists who sought to replace 
Christianity with its secularized alter-ego. 
Islamism is not a secularized attempt to replace Islam. The 
relationship between Islam and Islamism is not that between religion 
and ideology. Thus, Islamism cannot be understood as political 
ideology based on the secularization of Islamic concepts. Islamism 
reads Islam as being inscribed by the political from its foundation. This 
can be confusing as it seems to be endorsing the Orientalist description 
of Islam as being unable to distinguish between the religious and the 
political. Such descriptions are invalid because they begin with 
definitions of religion and politics as distinct spheres of human activity 
which in deviant cases can become confused. Such arguments tend to 
accept the Enlightenment definition of religion. If one does not think 
that this definition of religion is universal, and thus, that religions that 
do not conform to the pattern of Latin Christianity in specific periods 
of its history, are still religions, then the question about the confusion 
of religion and politics does not have the same scandalous force. The 
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Islamist conception of Islam sees it as the foundation of an order- thus 
1t is political by definition. According to Islamists, the correct 
interpretation of Islam recognizes its political nature and builds upon it. 
Having said that, I would like add that it may not be a bad thing to 
be skeptical of the idea that the relationship between philosophical 
roots and political practice is direct or transparent. Language and 
philosophy are simply tools and humans use them depending on what 
is necessary and what is needed. If they need a particular kind of word 
or a particular kind of concept, they will find a way to come up with it. 
One has to maintain a balance between recognizing a heritage which 
people work through and coming to the conclusion that they can never 
escape from or go beyond that heritage. I think \.ve're all working 
through our past but all the time it is being transformed in that act of 
working through. 
dC: T hat speaks to me that in the process of encountering heritage, 
especially in a colonized people, there are at least two heritages to draw 
upon: the pre-colonial heritage and the heritage that comes from their 
colonial existence. In your book, I think you mentioned the word 
'hybrid' once and it's not usually used in this context. I was wondering 
if that has something to do with the definition of the term 'hybridity' or 
if it has to do with Islamism's privileging of the pre-colonial heritage 
where most conceptualizations of hybridity privilege the European 
heritage? 
SS: It is the case, the imposition of colonial rule was very often 
rxplicitly anti-Islamic. Partly, because in Asia and Africa European 
colonists often confronted a Muslim ruling establishment-an 
establishment they had to tame-and partly, it was a consequence of 
the way in which European identity was historically based on an 
antagonism towards Islam. One could imagine that Islamists would 
tend to favor the pre-colonial over the colonial, for during the pre-
colonial one could still conceive of Islamdom as having autonomy. 
I would agree with you that many conceptualizations of hybridity 
are conducted in the context of postcoloniality. Postcolonial clunkers 
have attempted to overcome the West/ Rest colonial distinction by 
valorizing hybridity, demonstrating that beyond the distinction of 
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West/Rest, colonizers and colonized, was a complicated picture that is 
belied by the purity of these bina1y oppositions. I would also agree that 
construction of all identities is not a pure operation- in other words, 
identities are formed by bringing together (articulating) constituent 
elements under the domain of a particular signifier. Thus, for example, 
the signifier "America" erases all its internal differences: when one 
speaks of America in the moment one is neglecting the difference 
between red states and blue states, between the West coast and East 
coast between small town and big metropolitan areas .. . This is not 
peculiar to the operation of the signifier "America." All ~ollecti~ties ~e 
formed by similar acts of erasure. There is a paradoxical relat:ionship 
between difference being necessary for the constitution of identity and 
difference being the limit of the constitution of identity. This tension is 
what is stabilized by the articulation of a signifier. 
dC: Your book conveys a measured optimism about the decline of 
Eurocentrism and the consequent possibility for different kinds of 
politics to emerge in places like the Islamic world. Are there other 
impediments that Muslims must overcome to realize such a possibility? 
SS: The real issue for the Islamicate world is not a crisis of culture or a 
crisis of theology or anything like that but is, to put it very bluntly, a 
matter of political weakness. This answers the ques tion, Why aren't 
Muslims more tolerant when they were tolerant in Andalusia?' or 
whatever example you want to use. Muslims are politically weak in two 
senses: they lack sufficient power to more or less control their destinies, 
and they lack a degree of political consciousness that the gravity of their 
situation perhaps warrants. As long as they remain politically weak, 
their capacity to imagine something beyond the West will be restricted. 
At the same time, as a consequence of history, all the major powers 
of the world confront restive Muslim populations. They all seem to 
have a "Muslim problem". Russia has a Muslim problem in Chechnya 
which has caused something like a third of the Chechen population to 
be killed or turned into refugees since Putin's war. The Indians have a 
Muslim problem in I<ashmir (and within their own minorities). Indian 
controlled I<ashmir is one of the most militarized places in the world 
with some of the highest number of security personal per head of 
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population. The Chinese have a Muslim problem in their 'wild wes.t'. 
The Europeans have a Muslim problem in relation to the postcolorual 
Muslim presence in their major conurbations. The Americans have 
historically had a Muslim problem through Israel, but now they also 
have a Muslim problem in their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
a sense, all the major powers have a convergence of interest dealing 
with restless Muslim populations. This hampers political maneuvering 
of Islamists- they can't really use one great power to maneuver against 
another because it always means abandoning some Muslim group ... 
diplomacy in this situation implies an accommodation with ~e 
oppression of Muslims somewhere in the world. Thus, Islarrusts 
attempting to use diplomacy often find themselves out-fl~nked by o~er 
1slamist groups pointing to the abandonment of a Muslim populatt.on 
as a consequence of making common ~ause with a. maj~r ?ower. I.f a 
movement seeks an accommodation \.Vlth the Russians, tt ts forgettmg 
about the Chechens. If it makes alliance with the Americans, it is 
forgetting about the Iraqis or Palestinians. In the absence of such 
diplomacy, the militarization of Islamism should not be such a great 
surpnse. 
dC: How much do you think the war on terror will be a force for 
political unification within the Muslim world? 
SS: I think it depends very much on how sustained the war .on terr.or is 
and to what extent it continues to provide a means by which regunes 
(Muslim and non-Muslim) are able to link their campaigns of 
eradication of Islamists with the \var on terror'. These 'dirty wars' have 
now been globalized under the rubric of the 'war against terror'-. -thus 
many Muslims see tl1e 'war on terror' as being against Islamdom m one 
way or another. If the 'war on terror' becomes a "permanent". fea~e 
of the new world order an institution of a global 'dirty war', tts logic ' . . . 
will help to bring about a convergence among tts various. enemt~s . 
Given that the 'war on terror' has a rather nebulous concept:ion of 1ts 
enemy -easily slipping from radical Islamists to ordinary N1uslims, it. is 
likely to enhance the process of politicization of the global Muslim 
community. Aheady, we have seen ho\.v one of the consequence~ of 
the 'war on terror' ts an increasing number of Muslims 
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becoming politically conscious. In the UI<, for example, a large 
proportion of the Muslim population participated ": ~on . s~on? 
marches against the invasion of Iraq. For many Muslims 1n Britain, it 
was the first time they had become involved in such demonstrations. 
There are some indications that we are witnessing the emergence of a 
distinct global Muslim public opinion in which corrunon narratives 
regarding current affairs are beginning to circulate. For example'. ~e 
anti-Zionist reading of the Israeli-Palestinian has become hegemoruc m 
Muslim corrununities through the world. Similarly, the opposition to 
American foreign policy is becoming increasingly widespread among 
Muslims. The question is whether these translocal narratives will 
enable ordinary Muslims to see the stories of their lives as part of the 
larger canvas. The close association between repressive Muslim re~es 
and the 'war on terror' risks thickening the belief among many Muslims 
that the agents of their repression are not just their local tyrants but 
also an 'international corrununity' which under the leadership of the 
United States has become inherently anti-Islamic. Such a development 
would mean that Muslims would see the travails of their lives as being 
caused by the actions of specific governments rather than being the 
natural state of affairs. Thus, the interpellation of ordinary Muslims 
into the discourse generated by the global 'dirty war' would entail a leap 
from the autobiographical to the historical. Such leaps are what 
constitute political awareness. It is important to recall that such leaps 
(from the autobiographical to the historical) had in the wake of the 
collapse of the communism and the end of the Cold War become so 
difficult to make, that many commentators saw in the end of the cold 
war the end not only of geopolitical competition but the end of history 
itself. The epistemological, economic and cultural domination of (neo-
)liberalism that occurred in the irrunediate aftermath of the Cold War 
sought to present, as Bauman suggests, only biographical solutions to 
social problems. The 'war on terror' has demonstrated that history has 
not come to an end under the golden arches of McWorld. 
dC: While you were describing the Muslim world, it reminded me of 
pre-Holocaust anti-Semitism in Europe. Is that a fair comparison? 
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SS: I think it is a very fair comparison. Islamophobia is--like anti.-
Semitism was during the period from 1885 to 1945--not confined to 
fringe or marginal groups within society, but can be found in the banal 
chatter of opinion makers, as well ordinary people. Many of the themes 
of anti-Semitism are being re-deployed to describe Muslims, e.g. 
notions of dual loyalty, Muslims as threats to the integrity of Western 
c;ocieties ... For example, the decision to introduce legislation in France 
banning the wearing of any religious symbols in public scho~ls was 
initiated by and centered around concerns about the weanng ~f 
headscarves by Muslim girls. Much of the debate around this 
legislation denied all agency to Muslim women who w~re th~ hij.ab, in 
favor of Orientalist fantasies in which these 'dusky' maidens 1Il distress 
' are rescued from their plight by the French Republic's Enlightenment-
armed white knights. . . 
But I would not want to give the impression that Islamophob1a 1s 
solely a European phenomenon. I think it is far more prevalent and far 
1nore institutionalized on both sides of the Atlantic than some people 
arc prepared to recognize. It has been around in the United S.tates for a 
number of years and has become increasingly widespread smce 2001. 
It could be argued that the 'war on terror'-regardless of ~e 
protestations of innocence by its instigators-furthers this 
institutionalization. In the pursuit of this 'war,' governments 
throughout the \.vorld have been responsible not only for ~e ero~ion of 
civil liberties but also for the creation of a latent moral paruc which not 
only permits' but encourages the continued expression of Islamophobia. 
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